Why Did Shareholder Liability Disappear?
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Bogle, David A.; Campbell, Gareth; Coyle, Christopher; Turner, John D.
Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.

Measuring Inflation Expectations in Interwar Britain
Economic History Review, 2023

Lennard, Jason; Meinecke, Finn; Solomou, Solomos
What caused the recovery from the British Great Depression? A leading explanation--the 'expectations channel'--suggests that a shift in expected inflation lowered real interest rates and stimulated consumption and investment. However, few studies have measured, or tested the economic consequences of, inflation expectations. In this paper, we collect high-frequency information from primary and secondary sources to measure expected inflation in the United Kingdom between the wars. A high-frequency vector autoregression suggests that inflation expectations were an important source of the early stages of economic recovery in interwar Britain.

Foreign Debt, Capital Controls, and Secondary Markets: Theory and Evidence from Nazi Germany
Journal of Political Economy, 2024

Papadia, Andrea; Schioppa, Claudio A.
We investigate how internal distribution motives can affect the implementation of an important macroeconomic policy: capital controls. To do this, we study one of history's largest debt repatriations, which took place under strict capital controls in 1930s Germany, providing a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits. We formalize this mechanism in a model in which elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls.

The Legal Origins of Financial Development: Evidence from the Shanghai Concessions
Journal of Finance, 2023

Levine, Ross; Lin, Chen; Ma, Chicheng; Xu, Yuchen
The primary challenge to assessing the legal origins view of comparative financial development is identifying exogenous changes in legal systems. We assemble new data on Shanghai's British and French concessions between 1845 and 1936. Two regime changes altered British and French legal jurisdiction over their respective concessions. By examining the changing application of different legal traditions to adjacent neighborhoods within the same city and controlling for military, economic, and political characteristics, we offer new evidence consistent with the legal origins view: the financial development advantage in the British concession widened after Western legal jurisdiction intensified and narrowed after it abated.

Long-Run Trends in Long-Maturity Real Rates, 1311-2022
American Economic Review, 2024

Rogoff, Kenneth S.; Rossi, Barbara; Schmelzing, Paul
Taking advantage of key recent advances in long-run economic and financial data, we analyze the statistical properties of global long-maturity real interest rates over the past seven centuries. In contrast to existing consensus, we find that real interest rates are in fact trend stationary and exhibit a persistent downward trend since the Renaissance. We investigate structural breaks in real interest rates over time and find that overall the Black Death and the 1557 "Trinity default" appear as consistent inflection points. We further show that demographic and productivity factors do not represent convincing drivers of real interest rates over long spans.