
Infographics of Recent Publications
Reaching for Yield and the Housing Market: Evidence from 18th-Century Amsterdam
Journal of Financial Economics, 2023
Korevaar, Matthijs
Do investors reach for yield when interest rates are low and does this behavior affect the housing market? Using the unique setting and data of 18th-century Amsterdam, I show that reach-for-yield behavior of wealthy investors resulted in a large boom and bust in house prices and major changes in rental yields. Exploiting changes in the supply of bonds, I show that investors living off capital income shifted their portfolios towards real estate and other higher-yielding assets when bond yields were low and decreasing. This behavior exacerbated house price volatility and increased housing wealth inequality.
Why Did Shareholder Liability Disappear?
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024
Bogle, David A.; Campbell, Gareth; Coyle, Christopher; Turner, John D.
Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.
Dating Business Cycles in the United Kingdom, 1700-2010
Economic History Review, 2023
Broadberry, Stephen; Chadha, Jagjit S.; Lennard, Jason; Thomas, Ryland
This paper constructs a new chronology of the business cycle in the United Kingdom from 1700 on an annual basis and from 1920 on a quarterly basis to 2010. The new chronology points to several observations about the business cycle. First, the cycle has significantly increased in duration and amplitude over time. Second, contractions have become less frequent but are as persistent and costly as at other times in history. Third, the typical recession has been tick-shaped with a short contraction and longer recovery. Finally, the major causes of downturns have been sectoral shocks, financial crises, and wars.
Sticky Wages and the Great Depression: Evidence from the United Kingdom
European Review of Economic History, 2023
Lennard, Jason
How sticky were wages during the Great Depression? Although classic accounts emphasise the importance of nominal rigidity in amplifying deflationary shocks, the evidence is limited. In this paper, I calculate the degree of nominal wage rigidity in the United Kingdom between the wars using new granular data covering millions of wages. I find that nominal wages changed infrequently but that wage cuts were more common than wage rises on average. Nominal wage adjustment fluctuated over time and by state, so that in 1931 amid falling output and prices more than one-third of workers received wage cuts.
Independent Regulators and Financial Stability Evidence from Gubernatorial Election Campaigns in the Progressive Era
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024
Del Angel, Marco; Richardson, Gary
Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. The institutions' value is illuminated by a Progressive Era policy experiment when independent state-bank regulators came under governors' supervision. Afterwards, bank resolution rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks supervised by state but not national authorities. This gubernatorial-campaign effect diminished by two orders of magnitude, but did not disappear, after the FDIC became the independent resolver for all insured banks in 1935. In addition, during the Progressive Era, declines in bank resolutions led to declines in business bankruptcy rates, an effect that is not observed in the FDIC era. Our findings indicate regulatory independence can dramatically reduce but may not eliminate politics' impact on banks and the economy.