Real Effects of Supplying Safe Private Money
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Xu, Chenzi; Yang, He
Privately issued money often bears default risk, which creates transaction frictions when used as a medium of exchange. The late 19th century US provides a unique context to evaluate the real effects of supplying a new type of money that is safe from default. We measure the local change in "monetary" transaction frictions with a market access approach derived from general equilibrium trade theory. Consistent with theories hypothesizing that lowering transaction frictions benefits the traded and inputs-intensive sectors, we find an increase in traded goods production, in the share of manufacturing output and employment, and in innovation.

Shattered Housing
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Happel, Jonas; Karabulut, Yigitcan; Schafer, Larissa; Tuzel, Selale
Do negative housing shocks lead to persistent changes in household attitudes toward housing and homeownership? We use the residential destruction of Germany during World War II (WWII) as a quasi-experiment and exploit the reasonably exogenous region-by-cohort variation in destruction exposure. We find that WWII-experiencing cohorts from high destruction regions are significantly less likely to be homeowners decades later, controlling for regional differences and household characteristics. Underlying this effect are changes in household attitudes toward homeownership that also extend to preferences for housing consumption, with little or no support for risk preferences, income and wealth effects, or supply-side factors.

J'Accuse! Antisemitism and Financial Markets in the Time of the Dreyfus Affair
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Do, Quoc-Anh; Galbiati, Roberto; Marx, Benjamin; Ortiz Serrano, Miguel A.
We study the stock market performance of firms with Jewish board members during the "Dreyfus Affair" in 19th century France. In a context of widespread latent antisemitism, initial accusations made against the Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus led to short-lived abnormal negative returns for Jewish-connected firms. However, investors betting on these firms earned higher returns during the period corresponding to Dreyfus' rehabilitation, starting with the publication of the famous op-ed J'Accuse! in 1898. Our conceptual framework illustrates how diminishing antisemitic biases among investors might plausibly explain these effects. Our paper provides novel insights on how antisemitism can increase and decrease over short periods of time at the highest socio-economic levels in response to certain events, which in turn can affect firm value in financial markets.

Independent Regulators and Financial Stability Evidence from Gubernatorial Election Campaigns in the Progressive Era
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Del Angel, Marco; Richardson, Gary
Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. The institutions' value is illuminated by a Progressive Era policy experiment when independent state-bank regulators came under governors' supervision. Afterwards, bank resolution rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks supervised by state but not national authorities. This gubernatorial-campaign effect diminished by two orders of magnitude, but did not disappear, after the FDIC became the independent resolver for all insured banks in 1935. In addition, during the Progressive Era, declines in bank resolutions led to declines in business bankruptcy rates, an effect that is not observed in the FDIC era. Our findings indicate regulatory independence can dramatically reduce but may not eliminate politics' impact on banks and the economy.

Why Did Shareholder Liability Disappear?
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Bogle, David A.; Campbell, Gareth; Coyle, Christopher; Turner, John D.
Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.

Reaching for Yield and the Housing Market: Evidence from 18th-Century Amsterdam
Journal of Financial Economics, 2023

Korevaar, Matthijs
Do investors reach for yield when interest rates are low and does this behavior affect the housing market? Using the unique setting and data of 18th-century Amsterdam, I show that reach-for-yield behavior of wealthy investors resulted in a large boom and bust in house prices and major changes in rental yields. Exploiting changes in the supply of bonds, I show that investors living off capital income shifted their portfolios towards real estate and other higher-yielding assets when bond yields were low and decreasing. This behavior exacerbated house price volatility and increased housing wealth inequality.

The Big Bang: Stock Market Capitalization in the Long Run
Journal of Financial Economics, 2022

Kuvshinov, Dmitry; Zimmermann, Kaspar
We study trends and drivers of long-run stock market growth in 17 advanced economies. Between 1870 and the 1980s, stock market capitalization grew in line with GDP. But over subsequent decades, an unprecedented expansion saw market cap to GDP ratios triple and remain persistently high. While most historical stock market growth was driven by issuances, this recent expansion was fueled by rising equity prices. We show that the key driver of this structural break was a profit shift towards listed firms, with listed firm profit shares in both GDP and capital income doubling to reach their highest levels in 146 years.

Stocks for the Long Run? Evidence from a Broad Sample of Developed Markets
Journal of Financial Economics, 2022

Anarkulova, Aizhan; Cederburg, Scott; O'Doherty, Michael S.
We characterize the distribution of long-term equity returns based on the historical record of stock market performance in a broad cross section of 39 developed countries over the period from 1841 to 2019. Our comprehensive sample mitigates concerns over survivor and easy data biases that plague other work in this area. A bootstrap simulation analysis implies substantial uncertainty about long-horizon stock market outcomes, and we estimate a 12% chance that a diversified investor with a 30-year investment horizon will lose relative to inflation. The results contradict the conventional advice that stocks are safe investments over long holding periods.

Global Factor Premiums
Journal of Financial Economics, 2021

Baltussen, Guido; Swinkels, Laurens; Van Vliet, Pim
We examine 24 global factor premiums across equity, bond, commodity, and currency markets via replication and out-of-sample evidence between 1800 and 2016. Replication yields ambiguous evidence within a unified testing framework that accounts for p-hacking. Out-of-sample tests reveal strong and robust presence of the large majority of global factor premiums, with limited out-of-sample decay of the premiums. We find global factor premiums to be generally unrelated to market, downside, or macroeconomic risks in the 217 years of data. These results reveal significant global factor premiums that present a challenge to traditional asset pricing theories.

Dynastic Control without Ownership: Evidence from Post-war Japan
Journal of Financial Economics, 2021

Bennedsen, Morten; Mehrotra, Vikas; Shim, Jungwook; Wiwattanakantang, Yupana
Dynastic-controlled firms are led by founding-family CEOs while the family owns an insignificant share of equity (defined as less than 5%). They represent 7.4% of listed firms in post-war Japan, include well-known firms such as Casio, Suzuki, and Toyota, and are often grouped with widely held firms in the literature. These firms differ in key performance measures from both traditional family firms and non-family firms, and evolve from the former as equity-financed growth dilutes family ownership over time. In turn, the transition from dynastic control to non-family status is driven by a diminution of family legacy and talent.

The Telegraph and Modern Banking Development, 1881-1936
Journal of Financial Economics, 2021

Lin, Chen; Ma, Chicheng; Sun, Yuchen; Xu, Yuchen
The telegraph was introduced to China in the late 19th century, a time when China also saw the rise of modern banks. Based on this historical context, this paper documents the importance of information technology in banking development. We construct a data set on the distributions of telegraph stations and banks across 287 prefectures between 1881 and 1936. The results show that the telegraph significantly expanded banks' branch networks in terms of both number and geographic scope. The effect of the telegraph remains robust when we instrument it using proximity to the early military telegraph trunk.

Contracting without Contracting Institutions: The Trusted Assistant Loan in 19th Century China
Journal of Financial Economics, 2021

Miao, Meng; Niu, Guanjie; Noe, Thomas
This paper documents the emergence of a large bank loan market in the absence of contracting institutions: the trusted assistant loan market in 19th century China. These loans were legally unenforceable, one-shot loans to poor scholars that funded the costs of assuming lucrative administrative appointments offering ample opportunities for corruption. The trusted assistant loan's distinguishing feature was a legally unenforceable stipulation that the borrower incorporate an agent of the creditor into his administrative cadre. We model the enforcement of these loans through expertise leverage and test the model's predictions using data from officials' diaries and a bank loan book.

Rejected Stock Exchange Applicants
Journal of Financial Economics, 2021

Fjesme, Sturla L.; Galpin, Neal E.; Moore, Lyndon
We examine listing applications by firms to the London Stock Exchange between 1891 and 1911. The exchange rejected 82 (13.1%) of the 628 applicants to its main board. Accepted applicants were twice as likely to pay dividends (and to pay twice as much) and had longer firm lives than rejected applicants. Rejected applicants were more likely to file for liquidation than successful applicants. These results remain even after we control for the primary benefits of the listing itself: liquidity and future capital inflows. In this era, the London Stock Exchange could screen applicants for listing.

Credit and Social Unrest: Evidence from 1930s China
Journal of Financial Economics, 2020

Braggion, Fabio; Manconi, Alberto; Zhu, Haikun
Do credit contractions trigger social unrest? To answer this question, we turn to a natural experiment from 1930s China, where the 1933 U.S. Silver Purchase program acts as a shock to bank lending. We assemble a hand-collected data set of loan contracts between banks and firms, labor unrest episodes, and underground Communist Party penetration. The Silver Purchase shock results in a severe credit contraction, and firms borrowing from banks with a larger exposure to it experience increased labor unrest and Communist Party penetration among their workers. These findings contribute to understanding the socio-political consequences of credit shocks.

Limited Liability and Investment: Evidence from Changes in Marital Property Laws in the US South, 1840-1850
Journal of Financial Economics, 2020

Koudijs, Peter; Salisbury, Laura
We study the impact of marital property legislation passed in the US South in the 1840s on households' investment in risky, entrepreneurial projects. These laws protected the assets of newly married women from creditors in a world of virtually unlimited liability. We compare couples married after the passage of a marital property law with couples from the same state who were married before. Consistent with a simple model of household borrowing that trades off agency costs against risk sharing, the effect on investment was heterogeneous. It increased if most household property came from the husband and decreased if most came from the wife.