Dating Business Cycles in the United Kingdom, 1700-2010
Economic History Review, 2023

Broadberry, Stephen; Chadha, Jagjit S.; Lennard, Jason; Thomas, Ryland
This paper constructs a new chronology of the business cycle in the United Kingdom from 1700 on an annual basis and from 1920 on a quarterly basis to 2010. The new chronology points to several observations about the business cycle. First, the cycle has significantly increased in duration and amplitude over time. Second, contractions have become less frequent but are as persistent and costly as at other times in history. Third, the typical recession has been tick-shaped with a short contraction and longer recovery. Finally, the major causes of downturns have been sectoral shocks, financial crises, and wars.

Real Effects of Supplying Safe Private Money
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Xu, Chenzi; Yang, He
Privately issued money often bears default risk, which creates transaction frictions when used as a medium of exchange. The late 19th century US provides a unique context to evaluate the real effects of supplying a new type of money that is safe from default. We measure the local change in "monetary" transaction frictions with a market access approach derived from general equilibrium trade theory. Consistent with theories hypothesizing that lowering transaction frictions benefits the traded and inputs-intensive sectors, we find an increase in traded goods production, in the share of manufacturing output and employment, and in innovation.

Inflation and Individual Investors' Behavior: Evidence from the German Hyperinflation
Review of Financial Studies, 2023

Braggion, Fabio; von Meyerinck, Felix; Schaub, Nic
We analyze how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique data set containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the German hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy fewer (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. Moreover, we document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations, such as consumption needs, are unlikely to drive our results.

Foreign Debt, Capital Controls, and Secondary Markets: Theory and Evidence from Nazi Germany
Journal of Political Economy, 2024

Papadia, Andrea; Schioppa, Claudio A.
We investigate how internal distribution motives can affect the implementation of an important macroeconomic policy: capital controls. To do this, we study one of history's largest debt repatriations, which took place under strict capital controls in 1930s Germany, providing a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits. We formalize this mechanism in a model in which elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls.

Independent Regulators and Financial Stability Evidence from Gubernatorial Election Campaigns in the Progressive Era
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Del Angel, Marco; Richardson, Gary
Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. The institutions' value is illuminated by a Progressive Era policy experiment when independent state-bank regulators came under governors' supervision. Afterwards, bank resolution rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks supervised by state but not national authorities. This gubernatorial-campaign effect diminished by two orders of magnitude, but did not disappear, after the FDIC became the independent resolver for all insured banks in 1935. In addition, during the Progressive Era, declines in bank resolutions led to declines in business bankruptcy rates, an effect that is not observed in the FDIC era. Our findings indicate regulatory independence can dramatically reduce but may not eliminate politics' impact on banks and the economy.