Infographics of Recent Publications
Why Did Shareholder Liability Disappear?
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024
Bogle, David A.; Campbell, Gareth; Coyle, Christopher; Turner, John D.
Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.
Reaching for Yield and the Housing Market: Evidence from 18th-Century Amsterdam
Journal of Financial Economics, 2023
Korevaar, Matthijs
Do investors reach for yield when interest rates are low and does this behavior affect the housing market? Using the unique setting and data of 18th-century Amsterdam, I show that reach-for-yield behavior of wealthy investors resulted in a large boom and bust in house prices and major changes in rental yields. Exploiting changes in the supply of bonds, I show that investors living off capital income shifted their portfolios towards real estate and other higher-yielding assets when bond yields were low and decreasing. This behavior exacerbated house price volatility and increased housing wealth inequality.
Real Effects of Supplying Safe Private Money
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024
Xu, Chenzi; Yang, He
Privately issued money often bears default risk, which creates transaction frictions when used as a medium of exchange. The late 19th century US provides a unique context to evaluate the real effects of supplying a new type of money that is safe from default. We measure the local change in "monetary" transaction frictions with a market access approach derived from general equilibrium trade theory. Consistent with theories hypothesizing that lowering transaction frictions benefits the traded and inputs-intensive sectors, we find an increase in traded goods production, in the share of manufacturing output and employment, and in innovation.
Foreign Debt, Capital Controls, and Secondary Markets: Theory and Evidence from Nazi Germany
Journal of Political Economy, 2024
Papadia, Andrea; Schioppa, Claudio A.
We investigate how internal distribution motives can affect the implementation of an important macroeconomic policy: capital controls. To do this, we study one of history's largest debt repatriations, which took place under strict capital controls in 1930s Germany, providing a wealth of quantitative and historical evidence. We show that the authorities kept private repatriations under strict control, thus avoiding detrimental macroeconomic effects, while allowing discretionary repatriations in order to reap internal political benefits. We formalize this mechanism in a model in which elite capture can affect optimal debt repatriations and the management of official reserves under capital controls.
Shattered Housing
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024
Happel, Jonas; Karabulut, Yigitcan; Schafer, Larissa; Tuzel, Selale
Do negative housing shocks lead to persistent changes in household attitudes toward housing and homeownership? We use the residential destruction of Germany during World War II (WWII) as a quasi-experiment and exploit the reasonably exogenous region-by-cohort variation in destruction exposure. We find that WWII-experiencing cohorts from high destruction regions are significantly less likely to be homeowners decades later, controlling for regional differences and household characteristics. Underlying this effect are changes in household attitudes toward homeownership that also extend to preferences for housing consumption, with little or no support for risk preferences, income and wealth effects, or supply-side factors.





