Independent Regulators and Financial Stability Evidence from Gubernatorial Election Campaigns in the Progressive Era
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Del Angel, Marco; Richardson, Gary
Regulatory independence forms a foundation for modern financial systems. The institutions' value is illuminated by a Progressive Era policy experiment when independent state-bank regulators came under governors' supervision. Afterwards, bank resolution rates declined during gubernatorial election campaigns for banks supervised by state but not national authorities. This gubernatorial-campaign effect diminished by two orders of magnitude, but did not disappear, after the FDIC became the independent resolver for all insured banks in 1935. In addition, during the Progressive Era, declines in bank resolutions led to declines in business bankruptcy rates, an effect that is not observed in the FDIC era. Our findings indicate regulatory independence can dramatically reduce but may not eliminate politics' impact on banks and the economy.

Dating Business Cycles in the United Kingdom, 1700-2010
Economic History Review, 2023

Broadberry, Stephen; Chadha, Jagjit S.; Lennard, Jason; Thomas, Ryland
This paper constructs a new chronology of the business cycle in the United Kingdom from 1700 on an annual basis and from 1920 on a quarterly basis to 2010. The new chronology points to several observations about the business cycle. First, the cycle has significantly increased in duration and amplitude over time. Second, contractions have become less frequent but are as persistent and costly as at other times in history. Third, the typical recession has been tick-shaped with a short contraction and longer recovery. Finally, the major causes of downturns have been sectoral shocks, financial crises, and wars.

Why Did Shareholder Liability Disappear?
Journal of Financial Economics, 2024

Bogle, David A.; Campbell, Gareth; Coyle, Christopher; Turner, John D.
Why did shareholder liability disappear? We address this question by looking at its use by British insurance companies until its complete disappearance. We explore three possible explanations for its demise: (1) regulation and government-provided policyholder protection meant that it was no longer required; (2) it had become de facto limited; and (3) shareholders saw an opportunity to expunge something they disliked when insurance companies grew in size. Using hand-collected archival data, our findings suggest investors attached a risk premium to companies with shareholder liability, and it was phased out as insurance companies expanded, which meant that they were better able to pool risks.

Inflation and Individual Investors' Behavior: Evidence from the German Hyperinflation
Review of Financial Studies, 2023

Braggion, Fabio; von Meyerinck, Felix; Schaub, Nic
We analyze how individual investors respond to inflation. We introduce a unique data set containing information on local inflation and security portfolios of more than 2,000 clients of a German bank between 1920 and 1924, covering the German hyperinflation. We find that individual investors buy fewer (sell more) stocks when facing higher local inflation. This effect is more pronounced for less sophisticated investors. Moreover, we document a positive relation between local inflation and forgone returns following stock sales. Our findings are consistent with individual investors suffering from money illusion. Alternative explanations, such as consumption needs, are unlikely to drive our results.

The Legal Origins of Financial Development: Evidence from the Shanghai Concessions
Journal of Finance, 2023

Levine, Ross; Lin, Chen; Ma, Chicheng; Xu, Yuchen
The primary challenge to assessing the legal origins view of comparative financial development is identifying exogenous changes in legal systems. We assemble new data on Shanghai's British and French concessions between 1845 and 1936. Two regime changes altered British and French legal jurisdiction over their respective concessions. By examining the changing application of different legal traditions to adjacent neighborhoods within the same city and controlling for military, economic, and political characteristics, we offer new evidence consistent with the legal origins view: the financial development advantage in the British concession widened after Western legal jurisdiction intensified and narrowed after it abated.